


Montague – CTE Scholar

Dechun Wang (2009-2010)





Case Development: How does ownership structure affect financial reporting?

Case 1: Dual-class ownership structure and financial reporting conservatism

Why is this topic important?

- 1. Dual class firms are fairly common in the U.S.
- 2. Dual class ownership represents a unique type of ownership structure.
- 3. This type of ownership structure enhances insiders' control
- 4. Insiders have incentives to report less conservative financial information in order to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders

Data:

- 1. Dual-class data are from Gompers et al. (2009)
- 2. Family firms are collected from corporate proxy disclosure
- 3. Other data are from the commercial databases.

Findings:

Dual-class firms are less conservative in financial reporting. Opaque information environment may help insiders expropriate wealth from minority shareholders.

Implications:

A wholesale abolishment of dual-class ownership structure? Yes, based the results from this study.



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Students' learning objectives:

- 1. Why do corporate governance and ownership structure matter in financial reporting?
- 2. Why is high quality financial reporting and disclosure important?
- 3. Why and how do the incentives of the preparers' financial statements affect the quality of financial reporting and disclosure?

The cases will be used as a part of the teaching of intermediate accounting – corporate disclosures.

Case 2: Founding family ownership, dual-class shares and earning management - in process

Why is this topic important?

- 1. More than 35% S&P 500 companies are family-owned businesses.
- 2. Family firms report higher quality accrual-based financial information relative to non-family firms.
- 3. Structuring transactions is another means of earnings management. Are family firms more likely to manage earnings through structuring transactions such as channel stuffing?

	co_conm	co_tic	fyear	f_fam	Dual?	ffm Share	Total SH f	fam% i	nsider_shr l	y 5pct_shr non	fam_5p FM1	FM2 FI	M3 FM4
	ADOBE SYSTEMS INC	ADBE	2006	1	0	2,886,275	601,307,315	0.48	10,427,595	0	12.64 John E.	Charles M	I. Geschke
	ADOBE SYSTEMS INC	ADBE	2007	1	0	2,933,756	587,927,044	0.499	10,018,029	0	19.81 John E.	Charles N	I. Geschke
	ADOBE SYSTEMS INC	ADBE	2008	1	0	2,755,091	551,018,166	0.5	7,928,491	0	11.8 John E.	Charles M	I. Geschke
•	AFFILIATED COMPUTER SERVICE	ACS	2003	1	1	2,656,269	126,488,989	2.1	3,813,762	0	19.33 Darwin	Denson	
ghts	AFFILIATED COMPUTER SERVICE	ACS	2004	1	1	2,595,352	121,847,530	2.13	3,319,836	0	15.27 Darwin	Denson	
	AFFILIATED COMPUTER SERVICE	ACS	2005	1	1	2,349,030	119,049,235	1.97	5,086,150	0	17.58 Darwin	Denson	

Data collection: proxy statements of S&P 500 firms2003-2008